An Apology for Philosophical Transgressions by Heisig, James W.
European Journal of Japanese Philosophy 2 • 2017, pp. 43–67
An Apology for Philosophical Transgressions
The essay that follows is, in substance, a lecture delivered in Brussels on 7 
December 2016 to the 2nd International Conference of the European Net-
work of Japanese Philosophy. In it I argue that the strategy of qualifying 
nothingness as an “absolute,” which was adopted by Kyoto School thinkers 
as a way to come to grips with fundamental problems of Western philoso-
phy, is inherently ambiguous and ultimately weakens the notion of noth-
ingness itself. In its place, a proposal is made to define nothingness in terms 
of “connectedness.” The discussion is bound on both ends by an apology for 
transgressing established academic boundaries. On one end, I open with a 
brief digression on a common ground for philosophies East and West as a 
mestizaje to which no tradition can claim dominance. On the other, I close 
with an appeal for restoring respect for the role of mythical narration as a 
way to bridge the connection between theory and practice without having 
to revert to moral absolutes, particularly as it relates to safeguarding this 
fragile planet of ours from the ongoing sepsis of economic “progress.”
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The strategy of drawing on western philosophical resources to bring a fresh perspective to problems rooted in Asian intellectual history has 
a history that reaches back at least four hundred and fifty years to Matteo 
Ricci’s discussions with Confucian scholars. To many critics of modernity, 
it is a history so badly scarred with the same hubris and triumphalism which 
fed the colonial and militaristic ambitions of the West that any sympathy 
for the spirit of philosophical adventure behind it has all but evaporated. 
Meantime, the complementary strategy of drawing on Asian philosophical 
resources to shed new light on perennial questions of the western philo-
sophical tradition has had to contend with the general academic bias against 
incursions by quasi-religious, pop-philosophical, half-baked ideas from the 
East. Like many of you here, I have marinated too long in the philosophical 
stew of Japan to take any of this seriously.
A philosophical mestizaje
Applying the tools of conceptual analysis and historical decon-
struction to the idea of engaging philosophies “East” and “West” in dia-
logue has led to criticism that such talk is at best naïve and at worst morally 
unacceptable or even violent. The same holds for the notion of a “Japanese 
philosophy,” which is said to endorse similarly subtle tyrannies of racial 
isolationism and cultural imperialism, if not to be just so much logical sil-
liness. As long as the critique remains at a level once removed from what 
those terms describe to those who actually use them, there is no hope that 
a simply change of vocabulary would make the criticisms go away, and even 
less hope of finding a common ground on which to refute them. The only 
victory that could possibly satisfy such attacks would be one where the van-
quished would join forces in turning the very tools that were their undoing 
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against other ideologically and irrationally tainted conventions infecting 
philosophical thought.
The caricature I have just drawn would be laughable were it not such an 
attractive and simple way for so many to refuse a place in philosophical his-
tory to intellectual traditions not nurtured in the Mediterranean basin. I do 
not see there is much to gain in refining those criticisms in order to tangle 
with them any further. I much prefer to offer an apology for having spent 
my life crossing established borders and then to lay out, as clearly and suc-
cinctly as I can, an apology for questioning a central tenet of Kyoto school 
philosophy.
I approached the study of Japanese philosophy much the same as I had 
approached western philosophy. On the advice of the older and wiser Jan 
Van Bragt, I first read selected essays of the three pillars of the Kyoto School, 
Nishitani, Tanabe, and Nishida. In time, as I found my way around more 
and more of their books, I came to realize that I knew far too little of the 
resources they were drawing on. The western authors whose names surfaced 
here and there were for the most part known to me. But there were other 
springs flowing in and out of their writings, many of them from under-
ground, of which I knew all too little. At times it was an unfamiliar name; 
at others, an unknown textual reference; and at still others, no more than 
an odd turn of phrase. Not every trail led somewhere, but over the years I 
tried to train myself to a workable feel for what the Kyoto School philoso-
phers knew from their cultural surroundings, from their formal education 
and upbringing, from their appreciation of the Japanese language, and from 
their intangible native sensibilities. 
I remember how Whitehead, the first philosopher whose complete works 
I had read as a young man, had driven me back to Plato and Leibniz; how 
Hegel’s Phenomenology and Logic had made me read Kant and Schelling 
again; how Heidegger and Jaspers only began to make sense when I went 
back to read Aristotle and Nietzsche more closely. And so it was that in 
the case of Japan’s philosophical tradition, I traced a few obscure, peculiar 
threads through the weave until I eventually found myself standing in front 
of a vast, but increasingly less exotic and surprisingly more familiar, tapestry.
As the range of resources opened to me broadened, the framing of philo-
sophical questions changed radically. A border transgressed is never the 
same border, and the more frequent the transgressions, the less likely one 
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is ever to feel completely at home on either side again. I remember think-
ing about this the first time I stood on the shores of the upper Amazon in 
Manaus, where the black waters of the Rio Negro and the muddy waters of 
the Rio Solimões flow along side by side, at different speeds, for more than 
three miles until further downstream they merge into one another and lose 
their distinct identities. 
Assuming there is nothing out of the ordinary in this process, I have 
marveled time after time, conference after conference, why, with such a rich 
mine of resources at their disposal, so many philosophers stand still on the 
shore upstream, writing treatises comparing one philosopher to another or 
one idea to another when they could use the confluence of their offsetting 
modes of thought to rewrite the philosophical map and recode fundamental 
questions. 
It is not scholars of Eastern philosophers discussing with their counter-
parts in western philosophy who will release philosophy from its bondage 
to the thought systems that originated in the Mediterranean basin. It is not 
the textual exegetes or historians of ideas who have had the greatest dialogi-
cal impact, but those mestizos who have already begun to philosophize using 
resources from both to pry western philosophy open.
As William James remarked, if philosophy, as Plato and Aristotle said, 
begins in wonder, it
is able to fancy everything different from what it is. It sees the familiar as if 
it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar. It can take things up 
and lay them down again. It rouses us from our native dogmatic slumber and 
breaks up our caked prejudices.1
It would be wrong to think that this is the privilege of established senior 
professors. The work in which James wrote these words, Some Problems of 
Philosophy bears the subtitle A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy. 
Exactly. From the start and at any point after that, postponing, sacrificing, 
or diluting wonder is the death of philosophy. The world that lies between 
the lines of Japan’s philosophical texts is too startling to be domesticated by 
pulling out one or the other idea, comparing it to a similar idea from west-
1. Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy (New York: 
Long mans, Green, and Co. , 1921), 7.
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ern philosophy, and then closing the book. Unless one takes into account 
the confluent state of mind in which their ideas took shape, there is little to 
wonder at in any coincidence of ideas.
It is one thing to use words like “East and West” and “Japanese philoso-
phy” to denote fixed blocs of reality that can be contrasted, compared, and 
brought into contact as such. It is another thing to use them as temporary 
markers that lose much of their usefulness and dependability in a conflu-
ence of philosophical worlds. Accusations of a subversive agenda at work 
behind the scenes may still be made, but they are no reasonable grounds to 
honor them with a response—unless, of course, one wishes to take on the 
radical campaign of holding every distinction made in the history of phi-
losophy suspect to the charge of treason.
In-depth study of Eastern philosophers and comparative studies of indi-
vidual philosophers or currents of thought seem to have found their place as 
acceptable forms of East-West philosophical dialogue. Broadening the base 
of who is included in the history of philosophy can be an important first step 
in that direction, but it is just as likely to distract attention from the more 
radical step of including the resources of another tradition in philosophical 
thinking proper. If there is any chance of bringing philosophers East and 
West into dialogue, it will not take place in an encounter between recog-
nized representatives of each side. If western philosophies are to open up 
to other philosophies in anything approaching the measure in which they 
have themselves been received around the world, it will not take place only 
in dialogue among specialists with their counterparts in other traditions or 
in comparative studies. Rather, western philosophers need to talk seriously 
with the philosophical mestizos who have already taken steps to do their 
thinking with a greater wealth of materials than those of their own tradition 
and many of whom can no longer say with confidence which tradition they 
belong to. This mestizaje is a hidden treasure within our reach, and it is hard 
to understand how it can still be systematically ignored, because without it, 
western philosophy’s ambitions to “world philosophy” will remain embar-
rassed by its attachment to pedigree.
I am afraid if I ramble on any further, I will begin to give the impression of 
a tantrum thrown by a neglected child. For my part, I believe that openness 
to philosophical funds from the East is an irreversible insight for a younger 
generation of students drawn to philosophical thinking, and that they will 
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be the ones, through their teaching and writing, to break down the walls of 
the echo chamber in which so much of philosophy continues to justify itself.
There are many ways to employ the resources of Japanese philosophy, but 
the most difficult of them—and also, I believe, the most philosophical—is 
to look at the world through a lens ground to the measure of different pre-
suppositions, to examine the refraction critically, and then to adjust one’s 
own worldview accordingly. It is just this kind of mestizaje I mean to bear 
the brunt of my apology here for transgressions into Japanese philosophy.
Dissolving the absolute
I begin with a deep slash of Ocham’s razor aimed at the idea of the 
absolute dominant in Kyoto school philosophy. For the pivotal thinkers of 
the school, Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, and Nishitani Keiji, allusions 
to “the absolute” and to certain ideas and philosophical tools as “absolute” 
are so frequent and so centrally positioned that their respective worldviews 
would appear to totter without them. 
The immediate stimulus for making nothingness into an absolute may 
have come from Hegel, who established the absolute as a philosophical 
concept into western philosophy, but it would not have taken the hold it 
did, had it not also struck a chord in the Buddhist sensitivities of the Kyoto 
philosophers. The slow, dialectical ascent of mind through its relative 
conditioning to the final freedom of pure self-consciousness and absolute 
knowledge where subject and object have been transcended was a natural 
fit for making the ideal of enlightenment philosophically reasonable. For all 
their criticisms of Hegel in the particulars, the general modes of thought 
Hegel opened up for them were crucial in shaping their ideas. Never mind 
that Hegel’s stature in an intellectual tradition that had only recently come 
into contact with western philosophy was too great to ignore, the way the 
Kyoto School philosophers adopted the dialectical method and sanctified 
the notion of the absolute was far from unambiguously Hegelian. Yet even 
taking into account the sum total of their criticisms, I am persuaded that 
the adoption was misguided.2 In fact, aside from its use as a marker for criti-
2. In his book, The Kyoto School’s Takeover of Hegel: Nishida, Nishitani, and Tanabe Remake 
the Philosophy of Spirit (Lanham, md: Lexington Books, 2011), Peter Suares has taken a first 
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cisms against the absolute of being, the notion of an absolute of nothingness 
is only of limited use to them. I have come to believe that Kyoto School phi-
losophies of nothingness would be better off dispensing altogether with the 
notion of an absolute and returning the notion of the relative from its exile 
at the fringes to the center of the field of vision. The dispensation is not as 
difficult as the verbal tangles would lead one to believe. 
To begin with, the use of the word absolute in Kyoto School philosophy 
is not univocal. To be clear about what I am proposing, let me lay out three 
distinct meanings of the term absolute from their texts. As important as the 
distinctions are, they rarely rise to the surface and it is not uncommon to see 
overlaps of meaning in the same sentence, leaving it to the reader to sort out 
the muddle or—which is more often the case—ignore it altogether. 
In a first and literal sense, the absolute refers to a reality that by nature 
completely transcends the reality of the world, cut off from dependence on 
anything else, dislocated from any wider environment, unaffected by time 
and history. Second, there is a revised literal sense in which all the qualities 
of the literal absolute are not given originally but achieved as the culmina-
tion of an extended interaction with the world. Here absoluteness is the 
final stage of a process which may or may not entail a self-emanation of real-
ity that eventually recovers its primordial identity by being poured out of 
itself and then flowing back into itself through time. Finally, there is a meta-
phorical use of the absolute which is only marginally related to one or the 
other literal or revised literal meanings and is meant to describe something 
or some event as complete, utter, consummate, unsurpassed, unqualified, or 
simply as infinite. Its usage is more or less rhetorical, depending on the con-
text, but in no way is it obliged to either of the first two meanings.
By tying the absolute to the dialectic—affirmations generated by negat-
ing negations and subsuming contradictions—the absolute forfeits the kind 
of literal meaning it has, for example, in dualistic theism, and takes on a 
revised sense. The identity that Nishida claimed for “the absolute” is in fact 
dependent on its relationship to that which it is not in the sense that it sub-
sumes into itself that negation of itself and thereby negates its own separa-
step towards sorting out and evaluating Kyoto School readings of Hegel. The suspicions I am 
raising here run deeper to question the extent of their engagement as a distraction.
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tion from what it is not. Nishida is clear on this point, as one passage in his 
final essay advises:
The true absolute does not simply cut itself off from opposition. If it did, 
it would be no more than absolute negation and could not avoid being 
relativized. The true absolute must be something that faces its own absolute 
negation in itself and includes it in itself…, something that mediates itself 
through absolute negation.3
Now it might warm the heart of a Hegelian to talk of the absoluteness of 
the absolute as a negation of its own absoluteness, but I find myself cringing 
at the reliance on dialectical logic to decide what is a “true” absolute and 
what is not. I will have more to say of this later, but for now it is enough to 
note that taking the term absolute to mean something like a radical inter-
nalization of relatedness itself unfairly expropriates the term relative and 
dilutes its original meaning. For one thing, there may be something seri-
ously wrong with the absolute-relative distinction itself. For another, not 
even the totally transcendent, totaliter aliter deity of the scholastic meta-
physics could qualify as absolute without discarding biblical language, not 
to mention living forms of theistic faith and centuries of the Christological 
imagination. The idea of making nothingness into an absolute by contrast-
ing it with the absolute God of being was a misleading strategy and I am per-
suaded Kyoto School philosophy would have been better off without it. In 
any event, when supremacy is transferred from God to nothingness, God is 
in effect made relative to the absolute of nothingness. Whatever sentiments of 
ultimate dependency, whatever hopes and aspirations the idea of a supreme 
Being may stir in the soul, in the end it is relative to nothingness; as a literal 
absolute, it can only register as a failed attempt of reason to awaken to the 
true reality of the absolute. 
When it comes to talk of the absolute, Kyoto school prose is discon-
certing. One has the sense that it hangs together logically, but rarely the 
sense that much of any consequence hangs on it. To see the matter at hand 
through their eyes, to stand where they stood when they wrote what they 
wrote requires more than mastering the technical vocabulary they are 
using. Beginning with “absolute nothingness,” many of their terms were not 
3. 『西田幾多郎全集』(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004), 10: 333.
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predefined but worked out in the employment. For another, mastering a 
philosophical lexicon does not allow one to generate new ideas or criticize 
previous formulations unless one is also caught up in some version of the 
questions that prompted it. Obviously, none of this can be done by proxy. 
Either you wrestle with the ideas firsthand or you submit to them and spend 
your time parsing and paraphrasing the texts just as they are. All I can do 
here is outline the conclusions to which my own limited reading of the 
Kyoto school have driven me.
Just what kind of an absolute, then, is absolute nothingness? Despite 
disclaimers of comparison to the absolute God of being, the literal, strict 
sense of the absolute is at times an entirely fitting attribute of nothingness. 
If the absolute is said to denote unconditional release from anything that 
can claim a hold on it or stand vis-à-vis to it, if it is said to be absolved of 
all attachments, obligations, conditions, qualities, and even other modes of 
reality, it comes close to a dualistic view of reality. If the absolute of nothing-
ness cannot be a thing among other things, let alone the sum of all things in 
the world, then even if the world as we know it is ultimately a mental illu-
sion, it is still set up as one false, imperfect reality transcended by another, 
truer reality. For absolute nothingness to coincide with reality as it truly 
is, it must lie beyond the separation of mind and matter in a supreme and 
unchallenged self-identity, dependent on nothing, needing nothing, want-
ing nothing apart from itself. In this sense, the “self-awareness of absolute 
nothingness” is the negation of the experienced, phenomenal world and the 
affirmation of another world beyond experience and appearance.
To follow this line of reasoning would make philosophy meaningless, or 
at least reduce it to a radical negation of everything we think we know about 
the world and ourselves in it. The only way out is to de-absolutize the abso-
lute and somehow restore true reality to the world. This is precisely what the 
Kyoto school philosophers had to find a way to do.
If you permit me a quick aside, I find their quandary similar to the one 
that the God of scholastic metaphysics posed to Cusanus. In De docta igno-
rantia he attempted to skirt the ethereal theological speculation of the day 
by introducing a distinction between God as the maximum absolutum,4 and 
the rest of creation is a minimum absolutum. The terms “absolute highest” 
4. De docta ignorantia, Book i.2.
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and “absolute lowest” would seem to represent the polar extremes of real-
ity, a ne plus ultra and a ne plus infra, but in fact they are meant to depict a 
perfect coincidence of divinity and creation. The world and everything that 
makes it up are seen as a contraction of the divinity, leading Cusanus to cite 
the pseudo-Hermetic Liber xxiv philosophorum, “God is a circle whose cir-
cumference is nowhere and whose center is everywhere.” In practice, God is 
completely and utterly related to everything and everything to God—the 
exact opposite of a literal absolute.
Quite apart from any association with the God of Judeo-Christian faith, 
Cusanus’ God can be shown to fulfill the general requirements of a first prin-
ciple in Greek philosophy. Taking a lead from Pythagoras’ idea of a “seminal 
point” from which all of existence sprung, the Stoics posited a single prin-
ciple in which reason and reality coincide so perfectly that the logoi sperma-
tikoi that burst forth from it flower naturally into the multitude of things 
that make up the world.5 Were it not for the cause-and-effect duality set up 
between a creative one and a created many, the long Platonic tradition of 
the unity of the rational and the real represented in the Stoic model might 
have found itself at home in the rich Buddhist tradition of imaginative 
thinking on the nonduality of principle and fact. As it was, when Augustine 
transported this idea of seminal reason to the Middle Ages, he made the pri-
mordial unity of reason and reality subservient to an otherworldly, divine 
providence. Cusanus took a modest step back in the direction of the pri-
mordial unity the Platonists envisioned, and hence of the primordial unity 
of God and world that had hidden itself from the scholastic mainstream in 
mystical and hermetic literature. 
I have pulled out one thread from the enormous tapestry into which 
metaphysical notions of a first principle or “absolute” have been variously 
woven, but only to isolate the problem the Kyoto philosophers faced: how 
to adopt the idea of the absolute without allowing it to be controlled by the 
idea of an absolute otherworldly God. As their familiarity with the western 
philosophical tradition broadened, they came upon thinkers sympathetic to 
many of their own reservations and closer to the nondual worldview they 
5. For a helpful review of the question, see Hiro Hirai, “Logoi Spermatikoi and the Concept 
of Seeds in the Mineralogy and Cosmogony of Paracelsus,” Revue d’ histoire des sciences 61/2 
(2008): 245–64.
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wanted at all costs to preserve. Throughout it all, only the God of the philos-
ophers interested them. The personal God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob was 
left aside and did not even merit a refutation. In contrast, the idea of God’s 
self-emptying in the kenosis of the incarnation was an image they found 
sympathetic precisely because it served to negate the idea of a supreme, tran-
scendent being by defining it as essentially self-negating.
The Kyoto school thinkers ventured into these waters not out of a sense 
of obligation to any particular western philosophical tradition but because 
they wanted to position the idea of nothingness at the center of reality. To 
do that, they had to relegate being and the God of being to a lower status 
and to elevate nothingness to an absolute that would render all being rela-
tive to it. Standing on its own, the glyph 無 that we have come to render as 
“nothingness” was too ambiguous for philosophical argument. Adding the 
qualifier “absolute”—a kind of ignotium per ignotius—made the transition 
easier but only as an expedient means. Hegel’s conception of the absolute, 
which travelled in the same direction as Cusanus’ but in the open and at 
full speed, was the one the Kyoto school philosophers adapted to insert 
nothingness into the discussion and, finally, to de-absolutize the literal 
absolute of Western philosophy.6 Their revised absolute shared two fun-
damental traits with Hegel’s logic. First, it defined an ultimate universal 
encompassing all other universals and rendering them relative. Second, it 
introduced an evolutionary process by which the relative finds its way to 
union with the absolute. When Nishida depicted his logic of basho as an 
ascent of the self-aware mind to absolute nothingness, he did so with a 
series of concentric circles, the very thing that Hegel had done in describ-
ing all of philosophy as an “a circle of circles,” an image whose etymology 
figures in his choice of a term to designate his system as a whole: Ency-
clopedia. Incidentally, I am surprised never to have found a reference in 
Nishida or his commentators to this fact.7
6. In Tendai Buddhism 相待 was used to describe things understood in relation to or com-
parison with something else, and its opposite 絶待 was used to describe something supreme that 
cannot be described in terms of anything else. This pair of terms existed for a time but seems 
to have given way from the last nineteenth century to 相対 and 絶対 and were used to translate 
Hegel.
7. “Each part of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a self-contained circle, in which the 
Idea appears in its element as a particular determination. Each individual circle, imbued with a 
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Before we go any further, I should add a word about the third, metaphor-
ical use of the word absolute, a rhetorical emphatic that stands opposed to 
the de-emphasizing attribute relative, which describes a thing or action as 
partial or limited. Absolute negation, absolute mediation, absolute dialec-
tic, absolute love, absolute time, absolute death, absolutely unlimited, abso-
lute irrational, absolute disruption of reason, absolute contradiction—all of 
these expressions and more familiar to readers of Kyoto school philosophy 
are examples of this metaphorical use of the term. It would make no sense to 
describe death or love or dialectic or contradiction as the absolute, even in a 
revised sense, but this does not mean that the usage is simply hyperbole and 
that the literal sense is entirely absent from the connotation. Quite the con-
trary, the quality of absoluteness is attributed precisely to show that some-
thing of absolute nothingness has rubbed off on the idea in question. They 
all serve as markers of the absolute without themselves qualifying as abso-
lute in the same sense in which it is applied to “nothingness.” In other words, 
we are not speaking of something absolute in itself but something relative 
to that which is absolute in itself. Linguistically this is reflected in the way 
in which “the absolute of nothingness” is used as a synonym for “absolute 
nothingness” but not for any of other term described as absolute.
It seems to me that for Kyoto school philosophy, seen from inside or 
out, the adoption of nothingness as a metaphysical absolute in any sense, is 
superfluous, logically confusing, and philosophically distracting. If we take 
it as a synonym for the unity of reality, the One of which it is said that all 
things taken together make up, such a One would have to be relative to the 
many because it would have no meaning apart from the sum total of the 
many. Reality would be absolute only in the sense that it is a final tally and 
that there is nothing outside of it that can be called real. The word absolute 
adds nothing to the One that the many does not at once take away—unless, 
of course, you assume that there is some place in the world you can stand 
and see the One all at once. This is so even if you were to subscribe to a 
drive to totality, breaks through the barriers of its element to set the stage for a wider circle. In 
this way the whole presents itself as a circle of circles, each circle comprising a part so that the 
organization of the various elements constitutes the Idea as a whole at the same time as the Idea 
appears in each one of them.” Encyclopädie, § 15. Replace Idea with self-awareness, and the pas-
sage reads as a condensed version of Nishida’s logic of basho.
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monistic worldview in which the totality of reality is ultimately nothingness 
and not being. 
The revised sense of the absolute as the culmination of full self-awareness 
towards which relative beings are evolving has to contend with a number 
of objections. First among them is reliance on the dialectic as a producer of 
insight into a “true absolute.” The problem with dialectical logic, as Bergson 
would say, is not that it is too rational but that it is too intellectual and not 
rational enough. If, as Christian piety understands all too well, a transcen-
dent absolute of being, be it the orthodoxy of the scholastics or the panen-
theism of Spinoza, keeps us foreigners from God, an absolute of nothingness 
wedded to a dialectics of negation, as students of the Kyoto school should 
know just as well, obstructs our intimacy with the world. The reduction of 
meaning to a moment of eternity in time dispels history and is a clear sign 
that something is wrong. 
Aside from the general pattern of the dialectic in which negations and 
negations of negations propel the mind toward loftier and loftier affirma-
tions, the main thing the Kyoto philosophers took over from the Hegelian 
scheme was what they called “self-awareness of absolute nothingness.” Given 
their commitment to overcoming the subjective self that we usually asso-
ciate with consciousness and the objective reality that we usually associate 
with the world, Hegel’s objective consciousness with its culmination in 
absolute knowledge did not seem to them a true absolute. The ambiguity of 
the phrase occasionally suggests, and we said as much above, that absolute 
nothingness is somehow aware of itself, but it is normally meant to imply 
that it is that to which the mind awakens at its highest level of performance. 
This presents the idea with a predicament. On the one hand, making the 
fully awakened mind an ontological absolute is out of the question, either as 
the mind of individual subjects or as some cosmic mind like Hegel’s. On the 
other, to talk of mind at all is to talk of something that really exists, which 
disqualifies it as a nothingness.
The long and short of it is that if nothingness is absolute, it is unaffected 
by the fact that minds are aware of it, or at least infer it by seeing through 
the relativity of everything around them. The only way it could be “cut 
off ” from the relative is if it were no more than an infinite void like Plato’s 
chōra. The reason for bothering to enhance awareness is not that it somehow 
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secures final unity with the void of nothingness, since there is literally and 
without qualification nothing to unify with. 
As Hegel realized, our attempts to be reasonable are part of reality, but 
the dialectical bridge from abstract logic and its necessities to actual life 
cannot bear the weight of ordinary experience. Assume that human con-
sciousness is the highest form of mental activity in the universe if you will, 
to make its path to perfection into an absolute with no wider environment 
to embrace it is an offense to the long history out of which our conscious-
ness evolved. Nothing real is without its environment, and I see no good 
reason that claims of absoluteness for nothingness should suggest other-
wise. I do not see that the Kyoto school’s revised notion of the absolute 
escaped from Hegel’s faith in truth as eternal, objective, necessary, and one, 
and his view of the world as one in which only what must be are real, can 
withstand the moral and aesthetic demands of living in a world in which 
the most we can say most of the time is how things may be. To say that only 
that which has no environment, no basho, is ultimately true defies our every 
attempt to be reasonable in practice, however much it satisfies the con-
templative intellect. The idea of absolute nothingness is a soap bubble that 
refracts the whole of the world for a brief moment, only to dissolve at the 
slightest breeze of change.
I am afraid I have oversimplified, but only enough to show that the noth-
ingness of the Kyoto School philosophers cannot amount to an absolute 
in any but a metaphorical sense. It may seem that I have plucked too many 
feathers from the idea of absolute nothingness to leave it any hope of flight. 
But if we eliminate talk of a literal absolute from the discussion of nothing-
ness, Nishida’s claim cited above implies that the historical world of being 
and becoming argues against the absoluteness of the absolute, and that abso-
lute nothingness is only truly absolute when it is not absolutely cut off from 
the world of relative beings but directly related to it. In short, the only way 
to preserve the true nature of the absolute is that it not be seen as absolute in 
any literal sense at all.
Think of it. If there is no greater enveloping presence or power to which 
nothingness can be called “relative,” then it would seem to merit the name 
“absolute.” If nothingness is the absolute other of being, and being the rela-
tive other of nothingness, then there is a sense in which an absolute of noth-
ingness could subsume all relative being into itself and retain its absolute 
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character. But if the absolute has no being to embrace, if there are no circles 
within its circle, if it can no longer be called a universal of universals, then 
there would be no point to even using the term absolute. If, on the contrary, 
it is in the nature of the absolute to encircle what is relative, it still fails to 
merit the name “absolute.” If the absolute is only absolute vis-a-vis the rela-
tive, any literal sense of independence falls away. 
Referring to nothingness as an absolute reality is a half-truth, but the 
reason for suggesting we eliminate it altogether is that the part of it that is 
true tends to distract us from the part that is not. The vast emptiness that 
Nishida imagined to reach beyond the final circle of being without itself 
being encircled either will have to be reimagined so that the world of being 
and becoming can be held in the embrace of emptiness, or it will have to be 
reduced to nothing more than a critique of other pretenders to the throne 
of the absolute.
Re-imagining nothingness
There are other, more pressing reasons why the Kyoto school’s idea 
of nothingness can no longer feed on the empty husks of dialectical logic in 
its pursuit of the status of an absolute. I do not mean to ignore philosophy’s 
efforts to make reality as a whole, somehow or other, reasonable. I just think 
that the notion of nothingness as an absolute frustrates that end. In the 
attempt to highlight the logical confusion in the way Kyoto School philoso-
phers talk of the absolute, I have kept things on much the same high level of 
abstraction as their own texts. There is almost no indication in their writings 
of what practical difference it makes to the human community to think of 
reality as nothingness rather than as being. I happen to think it does, and I 
offer that practical reason as an apologia for trampling on their notion of 
the absolute.
Perhaps promoting the self-awareness of nothingness would make for 
a kinder view of society than promoting the struggle for power or wealth. 
But that promotion would make a mockery of critical thinking if it did not 
include the bigger question: What practical difference can it make to see 
reality in its full embrace of everything and everyone as an empty nothing-
ness rather than as, say, the sum total of all beings? If there are no reasonable, 
practical consequences, what reason have we to embrace nothingness and 
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forsake the many traditional paths at hand for arriving at radical skepticism, 
pessimism, and the despair of making any sense of the world?
While the literal sense of the absolute in Japanese—dis-connection, 対を
絶する—captures the philosophical meaning of the word, it contradicts the 
whole point of grounding a philosophy in nothingness. I see no reason to 
compromise. Let nothingness be understood in its most extreme, uncom-
promising sense and not diminished to an apophatic tactic aimed at dog-
matic descriptions of reality. Let it be nothingness pure and simple. Let it, 
too, be a philosophical ground, a fundamental, all-encompassing fact of 
reality. As we have hinted, nothingness would be unknowable, and thus 
meaningless, if it did not actually embrace anything. The world of intercon-
nected, relative beings is the only manifestation of nothingness we have. To 
understand the world surface and depth is our only path to awakening to 
the nothingness of reality. Nothingness must be radically—or metaphori-
cally put, absolutely—relative to this world in which we exist. The search for 
the unqualified and indefinite is not a search for the unrelated but for the 
supremely related—that which is related immediately to everything, always 
and everywhere. This is how I understand the Kyoto philosophers’ maxim, 
無即有、有即無: nothingness is only real in being, and being is only real in 
nothingness. 
For these reasons, I am convinced that a heavier dose of the classical Bud-
dhist conception of the inalienable reliance of ultimate truth on conven-
tional truth would better serve the logic of a “self-awareness of nothingness” 
than associating it with a dialectical logic of the absolute. I fail to see any 
cause for eliminating the mind and the ordinary reality of the world as pure 
fictions. I am in sympathy with Kawabata Yasunari when he spoke in his 
Nobel Prize speech of “losing the self and entering into the realm of nothing-
ness…, an emptiness in which everything communicates freely with every-
thing, transcending bounds, limitless,” but in which one remains “master of 
one’s own thoughts.”8 Far from having Kyoto School philosophy redefine 
itself as some kind of romantic transcendentalism or get lost in postmodern 
criticisms of the absolute, the self-awareness of nothingness seems to me a 
highly original but practical way of steering philosophy towards what seems 
to me its most momentous but largely neglected task today.
8. Japan the Beautiful and Myself (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1969), 56.
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What I have in mind is this: The concept of nothingness and our aware-
ness of it should not be defined primarily as abstract concepts, as reactions 
against western ontology, or even ways to describe the experience of “enlight-
enment.” These are derivative functions that can be justified only by the light 
they shed on a more basic problem: the search for an understanding of our 
relationship to the earth that can inspire us to put an end to the systematic 
havoc that civilization is inflicting on the natural world. Without a healthy 
planet, sooner or later human existence will be reduced to a caricature of 
itself. We have watched philosophy become marginalized throughout the 
twentieth century by the subservience of academics around the world to the 
economic and political order. The erosion of the teaching of philosophy to 
comply with the progress of education in a globally competitive world is not 
something for those with a philosophical vocation simply to monitor and 
criticize from the sidelines—or to do so to the extent that it does not jeopar-
dize one’s career or status within the philosophical establishment. To ignore 
the earth is matricidal. We cannot afford to send young students with these 
concerns back to the texts on the assumption that everything has been said 
somewhere before. The question sears the conscience precisely because it has 
been so slow to find its proper place in philosophical discussions. This is not 
a problem a dialectical logic of absolute nothingness can handle any more 
than that logic has been able to contribute to scientific research. I admit 
there is a bit of mischief in what I am about to propose, but my only regret is 
that I did not ask it sooner and more forcefully in the philosophical circles 
of Japan where Kyoto school thought is studied so fervently.
The notion of absolute nothingness circulating among Kyoto School 
scholars is not only irrelevant to the crisis of the planet; it is, at least indi-
rectly, an argument against its relevance. The best way to demonstrate this 
is to try to give it an expression responsive to the crisis that faces us. By that 
I mean, redefine it in such a way that it speaks directly to our experience, 
locates that experience in a broader tradition of thought, and opens up into 
an awareness of what is morally acceptable for the advance of human society 
on this fragile commons we call our earth. 
Raising this question, I am struck by the way the concept of nothingness 
changed shape in the short history of Kyoto school philosophy. Nishida’s 
absolute nothingness was through and through speculative. It managed 
to introduce the concept of the historical world without actually engaging 
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that world as it is lived. Tanabe took exception to this, but in his attempt 
to see absolute nothingness as a historically regulative principle rather 
than a metaphysically constitutive principle, he, too, failed to bring it from 
its rarefied heights down to the level of concrete moral choice. Nishitani, 
in contrast, was rich in concrete examples of how we experience nothing-
ness from the watered down nihilities of life’s frustrations to its full, radical 
sense. Others, like Mutai Risaku and Shimomura Toratarō labored to draw 
the broader human community and the problems of modern science into 
the picture without upsetting the foundations that Nishida had laid. In the 
process, however, the idea of absolute nothingness became diluted or at least 
pushed to one side. The next step, it seems to me, is to de-absolutize noth-
ingness, pace Nishida, and reexamine it in a way that honors the story of its 
development while admitting that it has become stale and out of touch with 
a growing awareness of the primacy of the earth.
It may seem an exaggeration to accuse absolute nothingness of blinding 
us to the devastation of the natural world. But the mere fact that it has not 
generated discussions of its own, that it has had to be bracketed for that 
discussion to begin, suggests otherwise. The problem, in fact, is not with 
nothingness (or with being, for the matter), but with two other matters that 
apply as much to philosophies of being as to those of nothingness. 
First is the imagined transcendence of the subject, one of those ideas that 
have deep and stubborn roots in modern philosophy since Descartes. The 
dominant idea of mind among Kyoto School thinkers is the very idea that 
we find Sartre criticizing for being detached from the world for failing to see 
ego as a temporary constellation of the social milieu.9 The transition from 
Kant’s transcendental categories of thought to a self-awareness liberated 
from the subject-object dichotomy assumes that, in the liberation, subjectiv-
ity can function in an elemental state without interference by the impedi-
ments of innate a priori or experiential a posteriori conditioning . It is from 
this state of mind that the compassionate return to the human historical 
world takes its start and defines its goal, namely, the spread of the same state 
of selfless action. In this sense, it is not surprising that care for the natural 
9. I am referring, of course, to his La transcendence de l’ego, a dense but important essay in 
which he argues against the phenomenological assumption that the ego can be defined apart 
from the concrete situation in which it finds itself.
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world is made subservient to the enhancement of mind in its natural jour-
ney to the self-awareness of nothingness. 
Second is the imagined unity of reality which, combined with the tran-
scendent subject, creates a distance between the individual and the vastness 
of the cosmos. One can lose oneself in the All-Einheit without actually relat-
ing to it responsibly. To surrender oneself to the cosmos may bring the self 
to an ultimate stage of transcendence, but may also anesthetize it against 
its obligations to its immediate surroundings. This is the self-awareness of 
nothingness at its most romantic. There seems little to gain by regrounding 
oneself in the world once the self has already lost itself in the groundless 
void of the all or absolute nothingness.
Structurally, the tendency to marginalize responsibility to the natural 
world in order to maximize the purification of the subject is not so different 
from the hope of an afterlife whose quality depends on regulations set down 
by an otherworldly transcendent being. This does not mean that the puri-
fication of mind as such is irrelevant to the health of the planet, only that 
insofar as it obstructs awareness of the problem it needs to be developed 
further. This is hardly a matter of irrelevance or secondary concern to a phil-
osophical worldview committed to the real world we live in. This further 
development begins with defining the notion of nothingness in such a way 
that self-awareness includes the natural world as an essential component. In 
effect, where the relationship to the earth is considered in terms of a self that 
relates itself to an absolutely transcendent, supreme being whose judgment 
it must survive to attain life beyond the grave, it is no different from the self 
that loses itself in an awareness of absolute nothingness. In both cases, there 
is a transcendence—divine or human—that needs to be relativized to the 
primacy of the earth.
It will help if we elevate the notion of the relative to the status that had 
been reserved for the absolute. To begin with, the relative need not be seen 
as the opposite of absolute. The opposite of the absolute is a radical pluralism 
that abstains from asserting a principle of unity at work in reality. The abso-
lute, one way or the other, always implies a principle of oneness to reality, 
even if experience at its soberest and most enlightened tells us that the actual 
world is a moving picture that surrounds us on all sides and looks differently 
from different perspectives. No matter how many small connections we can 
register, they do not add up to an assertion of absolute unity. Even so, radical 
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connectedness as such does not entail a denial of that unity, only a denial 
of its metaphysical supremacy. Absolute nothingness, in contrast, is inextri-
cable from a monism in which the self becomes selfless and being is awak-
ened to as a manifestation of an all-encompassing emptiness. The radical 
relativization of nothingness makes no such demands on our view of reality. 
Nor, for that matter, does it require notions of absolute space and time that 
shaped the dominant metaphors by which nothingness was distinguished 
from the world of being and becoming.
Let me be clear. The idea of a pluralistic reality seems to me a better fit 
for the idea of nothingness than a monistic view, but it is not required for 
a radical realtivization of the idea. The important thing is a positive notion 
of nothingness that preserves the essential Buddhist insight of the Kyoto 
School philosophers that nothingness is only real in being, and being is only 
real in nothingness. If we take the accumulated experience of the physical 
sciences along with our own human experience as a foundation, the idea of 
the radical connectedness of reality allows for such a positive view of noth-
ingness. Connectedness does not exist as such but is only manifest in the 
actual connections that make things real as what they are. To see nothing-
ness as connectedness means that nothing can be real and at the same time 
be disconnected from the rest of reality. Put the other way around, the idea 
of absolute disconnects, like that of absolute unity, are possible only in the 
speculative human imagination.
If everything in the world of being and becoming is, directly or indirectly, 
connected to everything else, it follows that the actual connections them-
selves are temporary and constantly being redrawn, rerouted, and miscon-
nected in a way that the mind experiences as disconnection. In fact, nothing 
has been disconnected. Everything that is, always is with something else, but 
there is nothing that includes everything. No transcendent unifier or prin-
ciple of unity is needed to hold this pluralistic reality in existence. To repeat 
the a thirteenth-century pseudo-hermetic text cited earlier, connectedness 
is the nothingness of a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circum-
ference is nowhere.
The idea of nothingness as connectedness is of course a metaphysical 
abstraction. As in the construction of a rock garden, one first sets the mas-
ter rock and then proceeds to set the other rocks in accord with its request. 
Connectedness is not an absolute ground but a foothold in relativity, noth-
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ing more. There is nothing novel about this image of reality. It is as old as 
Buddhist philosophy and as new as astrophysics. Versions of it are scattered 
across the entire intellectual and religious history of humanity. Its first func-
tion in philosophy is to clarify the foundational form of the forms of things 
that make up the real world, but that is not the end of it. On the contrary—
and this too is a very old, if often neglected idea—it needs to be accompa-
nied by a new image of metapraxis, the form of the forms of moral action. 
As we have been saying, even if we can imagine what seem to be disconnec-
tions, the sum of our experience does not allow us to imagine a disconnected 
world. All disconnects in the end turn out to be redirections of connectivity. 
New technologies and their accompanying modes of production and distri-
bution, for example, are often experienced as a human disconnect from the 
natural world. On balance, the benefits too often outweigh the disadvan-
tages, which are easily dismissed as a romantic desire to return to a simpler 
life that keeps us in touch with the world. This way of thinking needs to 
be looked at more closely. What we experience as a disconnect is in fact a 
loss of direct connection. This is not only true of our personal histories but 
of the tools we rely on for social life. Technologies and industries do not 
disconnect anything. Their immediacy and utility merely oblige us to take 
detours—longer and more labyrinthine detours as the process advances—
to reconnect with the natural world. The way we imagine the connections 
among the things that make up our life changes as a result. It is these detours, 
these undesirable irrelevancies, that need to be looked at, but that is only 
possible if we first recognize them as such.
This is where Ocham’s razor performs its most sensitive cut: to eliminate 
the absolute from our moral ideals. Insofar as an idea of nothingness or of 
another world disconnected from our own informs a praxis that deliberately 
sidelines the natural world and our responsibilities to it, metapraxis in an 
interconnected world is in peril of being reduced to the private realm or 
absorbed in the general ideological agendum of society. Nishitani, you will 
recall, describes the standpoint of emptiness as seeing the world in a kind 
of double-exposure in which the transiency of the world displays itself to 
imagination and liberates us from attachment to immediate desires and sat-
isfactions. At the same time, he insists that the world is more than an occa-
sion for refining personal awareness of the illusions that infect the mind. It is 
only really the world for us when we allow it to be what it is and not what we 
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imagine it to be for our own purposes. To actually do this, we need to go fur-
ther than Nishitani did. That is, we need not only to see through our image 
of the world but to walk through the detours that have distracted our imagi-
nation from our own conspiracy in the overconsumption and devastation of 
the planet. Self-awareness is incomplete without an exposure of the habits of 
thought and action that we have come to take for granted. The demands of 
daily life are so tangled up in a nonsense that passes for common sense that 
we no longer find it reasonable to demand fresh water, fresh food, and fresh 
air—or even pay attention to those whose enjoyments of these basic rights 
are being taken away from them in the name of technological progress. In 
a word, we have come into the habit of making do with a polluted savoring 
of the things of life that reconnect us more and more indirectly to the nat-
ural world. We experience the planet ambiguously, through technological 
misconnections that have turned it into a virtual reality, resigning ourselves 
to the idea that direct connection is no more than romantic pining for a 
bygone era.
Awareness of the form of the forms of thinking and the form of the forms 
of acting does not easily translate into a change of habits. Metaphysics and 
metapraxis alone do not provide the impulse to do so. Something more is 
needed to bridge the self-awareness of nothingness to the natural world, 
namely, an impulse to a living sympathy with the aboriginal, unknown and 
uncontrollable miracle of connectedness. Unless we can see our brief and 
fragile existence as part of a greater story, our metaphysical and metaprac-
tical speculations risk declining into moral indifference. I am convinced it 
is time to restore trust in the big stories that philosophy and science have 
collaborated to demythify out of rational thinking.
I recall some years ago standing in the Piazza del Duomo in Milan with 
a small circle of friends, one among many such circles there, engaged in ani-
mated discussion of our philosophical worldviews. I had just come from the 
quarters of Cardinal Martini and was full of questions and doubts that arose 
over conversation at dinner. When our circle dispersed, I wandered into 
the magnificent medieval cathedral at the head of the piazza. At once, the 
row of towering pillars transported my gaze up into the vast expanse that 
arched overhead. I felt, as anyone who steps into that space must, lifted up, 
my lungs filling up deeply and irresistibly with a sense of awe. As many times 
as I have known that feeling, I have never been able to contain myself, let 
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alone understand it. At such moments, it is as if one has seen the place where 
great stories of heaven and earth breath the air they need to speak of things 
more than words can tell.
These stories—many of them from traditional religious cosmologies, 
more and more of them inspired by scientific cosmologies—can help cast 
a bridge from philosophical speculation about our habits of thought and 
action to actual practice. No one is moved by all of them and not everyone is 
moved by any of them. Then, too, enough of them get distorted into literal 
or dogmatic verities which tear them down and built them up again as walls 
to cut off the faithful from the unbelievers. To reconstruct these stories as if 
they were the seepage of a higher truth from another world into our feeble 
and porous minds is to deprive them of their power to move. Literalism dis-
empowers them, and a philosophy satisfied with a critique of literalisms is as 
much at fault as a hermeneutics that scales them down to apophatic expres-
sion. Where these great stories are at their best, they serve to transform the 
chilly, rationalized ideas of the piazza into living but incomplete symbols 
that cry out for concrete investiture in action. Without such symbols, the 
hope of reconnecting to this sick and ailing planet of ours is seriously dis-
couraged. To put this philosophically, metaphysics and metapraxis need the 
complement of a metaiconography that includes more than the demystify-
ing and comparative study of mythologies. We coat these big stories with 
sugar or dust at our own peril. How very much we still have to learn from 
religions and cosmologies grounded in the natural world but marginalized 
by a rationalism that does not understand their unique reasonableness. 
Simply put, I do not see how we can manage our nearest neighbor, the 
earth, without inspiration from a story of the cosmos. Whether our philo-
sophical lenses are ground to the measure of nothingness or that of being, 
without these nonphilosophical stories, our philosophies cannot avoid con-
tributing to shortsightedness that the earth pays for day by day to satisfy the 
suicidal gluttony of civilization.
Concluding remarks
The argument can be made that the creativity of the Kyoto school 
has spent itself and that its only remaining influence is in the world of histor-
ical scholarship. Sure enough, that scholarship has raised a few eyebrows and 
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generated discussions about the western control of philosophy. I agree that 
to incorporate them into a new mestizaje is not to deculturalize philosophy 
but to interculturalize it. These thinkers remind us, too, that transcendence 
can be restored to philosophy in the form of transcending the limits of the 
everyday, self-deluded ego. But if their writings are to survive as more than 
arcana from the East, we need to find a place for the transcendence of the 
earth and to include its story, immeasurably longer than human reason, into 
their vision. Kyoto school philosophy has to understand that the great cos-
mic stories of creation and the exploits of the gods are not, as Tanabe once 
suggested, mere “myths to be washed away and transformed radically into 
dialectical symbols.”10 They are the cathedrals of the mind without which 
our relationship to the natural world is greatly impoverished. In the image 
of Rabbi Ovadia Ben Adar of Izmir, they are “the cradle between words 
and deeds, the place where our breath perceives the infinite, after which our 
mouth falls open with admiration and we cannot but smile.”11
 The idea of an absolute of nothingness is showing signs of ageing. Its final 
refutation, as I have been trying to say, comes from its moral consequences. 
It is far from obvious what kind of things an absolute nothingness would 
make morally unacceptable that we are not already sufficiently aware of. To 
ask that question, I suggested the notion of a “connectedness” that is our 
permanent environment but is not an absolute. Whatever lies beyond the 
nothingness we see manifest in the world of being and becoming is beyond 
the reach of our poor reason and the tools of our sciences and technologies. 
To allow the absolute of nothingness to define moral judgment is to devalue 
the world that lies within our reach as no more than a beguiling fantasy. 
Absolute nothingness is an upper-floor abstraction at the end of a steep and 
spiraling staircase. The way that leads to moral responsibility is down the 
stairs to the ground and out the door.
At the same time, there is every reason to endorse the efforts of the 
Kyoto school philosophers to find a proper place for religion in a philoso-
phy of self-awareness rather than dismiss it as a scientific embarrassment. As 
Jacques Lacan once remarked, “If science works at it, the real will expand 
10. thz 10:31.
11. Mario Satz, La palmera transparente. Parábolas, historias y enseñanzas de la Kábala (Ma-
drid: Editorial edaf, 2000), 200.
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and religion will thereby have still more reason to soothe people’s hearts.”12 
It is not only the all-merciful being of a deity that can soothe the heart; so 
can an absolute nothingness in which individual and universal melt into a 
dialectical identity of contradictory opposites, to use Nishida’s phrase. But 
here again, I have to insist: the soothing of our hearts and mystical union 
with the One are ultimately pointless if they render us insensitive to the irri-
tations and the injustices imposed on the much, much older world around 
us. As much as we need our cathedrals of the mind for personal comfort, the 
earth needs them more. 
François Jullien has helped us appreciate the basic ambiguity of the phil-
osophical quest of the universal—and I mean to include Kyoto School phi-
losophy here—by distinguishing between the uniform and the common.13 
Any universal that is not grounded in the radical pluriformity of reality is 
as much a perversion of the term as the economic and political pressure for 
globalization. The truer universal is a commons which is the property of 
everyone, every culture, every great story by being the possession of none. 
And what truer example of a commons can there be than the earth itself ? 
And what better way to honor the writings of the Kyoto school philoso-
phers than to draw their ideas out of the precincts in which they have been 
enshrined and into that commons to face the questions that the sufferings of 
the natural world are putting to them?
12. Jacques Lacan, The Triumph of Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 64.
13. François Jullien, On the Universal: The Uniform, the Common, and Dialogue between Cul-
tures (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).
